Financial Contagion in the BRICS Stock Markets: An empirical analysis of the Lehman Brothers Collapse and European Sovereign Debt Crisis by Dirceu Pereira
Journal of Economics and Financial Analysis, Vol:2, No:1 (2018) 1-44 
 
  
 
 
Financial Contagion in the BRICS Stock Markets: An empirical 
analysis of the Lehman Brothers Collapse and European 
Sovereign Debt Crisis 
Dirceu PEREIRA* 
Department of Economics and Management, University of Minho, Portugal 
 
Abstract 
This research analyzes and extends the study of contagion for BRICS emerging 
stock markets in the context of the last two international financial crises: the 
Lehman Brothers Bankruptcy Crisis and the European Sovereign Debt Crisis. We 
investigate changes in the relationship and the co-movements between BRICS 
markets in response to international shocks that are originated in advanced 
markets like USA and Europe. Employing data of daily stock market indices of 
BRICS countries, this research tests for contagion, examining the interactions and 
characteristics of price movements of BRICS stock markets by applying 
cointegration, causality and VECM/Gonzalo-Granger statistic and variance 
decomposition methodology on stock returns as a measure of perceived country 
risk. The results exhibit that both long-run and short-run relationships patterns 
exist between BRICS stock markets and have drastically changed during turbulent 
periods compared with tranquil period, pointing towards the occurrence of 
contagion phenomenon among BRICS markets during the last two crises. These 
findings also indicate that changes in the USA and the Euro Zone indices affect 
BRICS stock markets in the short-run, acting as a leading indicator for investing in 
BRICS markets. Also imply an increasing degree of global market integration, 
bringing major implications for portfolio diversification and policy makers.  
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Markets; Cointegration; Causality. 
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1. Introduction 
The acronym BRIC was ﬁrst suggested by Jim O’Neill 1 in 2001, in his 
publication “Building Better Global Economic BRICs”. The initial four countries – 
Brazil, Russia, India and China corresponded to BRIC. They were the rising stars of 
the Emerging Markets due to their large size, population and ambitious to 
become world’s leading economies propelled by their audacious growth. In April 
2011, South Africa joined the group as a full member, in the 2011 summit in 
Sanya, China. Hence, the group was renamed BRICS – to reﬂect the group’s 
expanded membership. Fifteen years later, after a Global Financial Crisis (GFC),2 
the expectations about the BRICS countries as the world’s leading emerging 
markets economies, still holds as the growth engines of the world economy, today 
and in the future (Bonga-Bonga, 2015; O’Neill, 2013).  
The rampant growth of the BRICS countries has substantial eﬀects for the 
capitalization of their stock markets as well as for their ﬁnancial dependence with 
other stock markets (Mensi et al., 2014; Visalakshmi & Lakshmi, 2016). BRICS 
economies have matured hastily and are becoming increasingly more integrated 
with the most developed economies in terms of trade and investment.3 
In the past three decades, various countries have been hit by severe ﬁnancial 
crises: the Mexican “Tequila Crisis” in 1994, the East Asian Crisis in 1997, the 
Russian Crisis in 1998, the Argentinean Crisis in 2002, the United States of America 
(USA) Subprime in 2007 and the Lehman Brothers Bankruptcy Crisis (LBBC) in 
2008 and, more recently, the European Sovereign Debt Crisis (ESDC) in 2010/11. 
                                                          
1 Chief economist at Goldman Sachs Asset Management (see O’Neill, 2001). 
2 The US Subprime Crisis in August 2007 and the collapse of the Lehman Brothers in September 
2008, sparked a GFC that aﬀected the real sector and caused a rapid, synchronized deterioration in 
most major economies (Gentile & Giordano, 2012, 2013). Subsequently, the eﬀects caused the 
Eurozone Sovereign Debt Crisis, which served as a catalyst towards further investigation of the 
contagion and spillover eﬀects among the USA, Eurozone, Emerging Markets and Asian stock 
markets. These interdependencies could provide evidence whether there is a seemingly growing 
integration in international markets with important implications for portfolio diversiﬁcation (Bekiros, 
2014). 
3 The BRICS together constitute more than a quarter of the world’s land area, more than 40% of the 
world’s population and about 15% of global GDP. The growth potentials in those culturally and 
geographically disparate countries are based on diverse attributes. Brazil is a resource-rich country, 
with resources such as coﬀee, soybean, sugar cane, iron ore and crude oil. Russia is well known for 
its massive deposits of oil, natural gas and minerals. India has a rising manufacturing base and is a 
strong service provider. China has a highly skilled workforce at low wage cost and it is considered 
the factory of the world. South Africa, the smallest of the ﬁve BRICS countries by land mass and 
world GDP contribution, is the world’s largest producer of platinum and chromium, and holds the 
world’s largest known reserves of manganese, platinum group metals, chromium, vanadium and 
aluminum-silicates (The BRICS Report, 2012). 
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All these ﬁnancial crises started in a speciﬁc country and region in the globe and, 
subsequently, their eﬀects spread to other countries and regions. Such 
transmission of shocks is dubbed contagion (Bonga-Bonga, 2015). 
Notwithstanding, the contagion term is not consensual, this research follows the 
largest body of the empirical literature based on the Forbes and Rigobon (2002) 
designation, where contagion is deﬁned as a signiﬁcant increase of cross-market 
linkages after a shock to one country or a group of countries. This contagion eﬀect 
undermines the purpose of the portfolio diversiﬁcation, revealing the situation 
where markets that were assumed to be weakly associated before a shock are 
subsequently found to be strongly associated in such a way that diversiﬁcation 
across markets fails to shield the investors from the unsystematic risk (Gentile and 
Giordano, 2012, 2013). This deﬁnition indicates that, if two markets present a high 
degree of co-movement during periods of stability and continue to be highly 
correlated after a shock to one market, this indicate interdependence4 rather than 
contagion.  
This research enriches the literature by focusing the study on the great 
importance that the eﬀects of contagion in the ﬁnancial crises across BRICS 
countries can reveal based on the magnitude of the interaction among them and 
what they represent globally. The focus of this research is pointed towards the 
LBBC and the ESDC in order to identify if there was contagion transmission to the 
BRICS countries and the implications of this phenomenon due to the great impact 
that both crises had in the behavior of the investors, which brought massive 
inﬂows of foreign direct investment to the BRICS countries, trying to hedge their 
investments (Nistor, 2015).  
To achieve this goal, we implemented a three-step methodology that capture 
the diﬀerent patterns of contagion transmission across BRICS countries stock 
markets, following Baig and Goldfajn (1999), Beirne and Gieck (2012), Gentile and 
Giordano (2012, 2013), Fourie and Botha (2015), and Boubaker et al. (2016).  
Our results clearly reveal an increase in the long-run connections among 
BRICS stock markets jointly with changes in the causality patterns, which have 
changed in the turbulent periods compared to the tranquil periods. The evidence 
suggests that contagion eﬀects strongly inﬂuenced the BRICS stock markets over 
both crises. These results also reveal that BRICS countries were not able to 
provide portfolio diversiﬁcation, indicating that both crises aﬀected their stock 
markets, revealing diﬀerent degrees of vulnerabilities among them.  
                                                          
4 When co-movements do not increase signiﬁcantly after a shock, then any continued high level of 
market correlation indicates strong connections among the countries that exist worldwide (Gentile 
& Giordano, 2012). 
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This empirical research is organized as follows. Section 2 contains a literature 
review, Section 3 describes the data and Section 4 the econometric methodology, 
which is followed by Section 5, the core section, which presents the empirical 
results and Section 6 concludes.  
2. Literature Review 
2.1. Contagion Phenomenon: Definition, Theories, Transmission and 
Measurement 
The different definitions of contagion, how it is measured, what causes 
contagion, how it is transmitted and why, is extremely important to understand so 
as to evaluate this phenomenon correctly and develop policy responses 
efficiently. Blaming financial crisis on contagion remains an elusive concern, highly 
contagious among politicians and economists. Without a clear understanding of 
financial contagion and the mechanisms through which it works, we can neither 
assess the problem nor design appropriate policy measures to control for it 
(Moser, 2003). Such understanding is needed to identify the economic 
implications both for implementing policies and for investors, who need to 
understand the nature of changes in stock markets to evaluate the potential 
benefits of international portfolio diversification and the analytical assessment of 
risks. 
Despite the significant theoretical and empirical interest of financial 
contagion, there is still no consensus about whether cross-county propagation of 
shocks through fundamentals5 should be considered contagion. Hence, we need 
to differentiate between pure contagion 6  and shock propagation through 
                                                          
5 Financial, real and political links, constitute the fundamentals links of an economy (Gentile & 
Giordano, 2012; Moser, 2003). The ﬁrst ones exist when two economies are connected through the 
international ﬁnancial system. Real links are fundamental economic relationships between 
countries. These links have usually been associated with international trade, but other types of real 
links, like foreign direct investment across countries, may also be present. Finally, political links are 
the political relationships between countries. Although this link is much less stressed in the 
literature, when a group of countries share an exchange rate arrangement, a common currency (in 
the case of the Euro Area Countries), crises tend to be clustered (Gomez-Puig & Sosvilla-Rivero, 
2014). 
6 Masson (1998) deﬁnes pure contagion as an unanticipated situation. Claessens et al. (2001)and 
Gentile and Giordano (2012) deﬁne pure contagion in the sense of Masson’s only when the 
transmission process itself changes when entering crises periods: when a crisis in one country may 
conceivably trigger a crisis elsewhere for reasons unexplained by macroeconomic fundamentals – 
perhaps because it leads to shifts in market sentiment, or changes the interpretation given to 
existing information, or triggers herding behavior. 
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fundamentals7. Some have suggested transmission (Bordo & Murshid, 2000; 
Lakshmi et al., 2015); spillovers (Broto & Perez-Quiros, 2015; Dungey & Martin, 
2007; Masson, 1998, 1999; Muratori, 2014); interdependence (Forbes & Rigobon, 
2001, 2002, Gentile & Giordano, 2012, 2013) or fundamentals-based contagion8 
(Bonga-Bonga, 2015; Kaminsky & Reinhart, 1998). This differentiation is defined 
by Moser (2003), indicating that shocks propagation through fundamentals is the 
result of an optimal response to external shocks, which is not considerate a source 
of pure contagion. For instance, a crisis in one country can cause disturbances in 
the equilibrium of other countries, causing an adjustment in the financial and real 
variables to a new equilibrium. In that case, financial market responses only 
anticipate and reflect changes in fundamentals, accelerating the adjustment to a 
new equilibrium, just transmitting and not causing the changes in the equilibrium. 
In other words, rather than causing a crisis, financial markets responses bring the 
crisis forward, being an example of fundamentals-based contagion rather than 
pure contagion (Moser, 2003). 
2.2. What is Financial Contagion? 
Contagion phenomenon generally is used to describe the spread of market 
disturbances from one country to another.9 In its broadest sense, therefore, 
ﬁnancial contagion is related with the propagation of adverse shocks that have 
the potential to trigger ﬁnancial crises. The core of the matter is to identify 
potential propagation mechanisms and deﬁne those that represent contagion 
(Moser, 2003). In spite of the greatest relevance of the contagion phenomenon, 
there is still no consensus on either the deﬁnition or the transmission channels of 
ﬁnancial contagion. As a ﬁrst step, it is helpful to understand what contagion does 
not mean and what it does mean.  
The World Bank 10 distinguishes three deﬁnitions of ﬁnancial contagion: 
broad, restrictive and very restrictive.  
                                                          
7 The theories based on fundamentals channels are the oldest, and the general idea is that links 
across countries exist because the countries’ economic fundamentals aﬀect one another. These 
theories are usually based on standard transmission mechanisms, such as trade, monetary policy, 
and common shocks (e.g., oil prices). 
8 Fundamentals-based contagion refers to the transmission of shocks that is due to real and ﬁnancial 
linkages or fundamental relationship of any kind, such as trade or macroeconomic policy, between 
countries (Bonga-Bonga, 2015; Dornbusch et al., 2000; Forbes & Rigobon, 2001; Masson, 1998). 
9 The process can be observed through co-movements in exchange rates, stock prices, sovereign 
spreads and capital ﬂows (Gentile & Giordano, 2012). 
10 Macroeconomics - Definitions of Contagion. Retrieved November 8, 2016, from 
www.go.worldbank.org/JIBDRK3YC0. (World Bank) 
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The broad deﬁnition: it is vague and generalist, this deﬁnition was used in the 
earlies stages of the research on contagion phenomenon. Under this approach, 
contagion is the cross-country transmission of shocks or the general cross-country 
spillover eﬀects during the crisis (Gentile & Giordano, 2012, 2013).  
The restrictive deﬁnition: it is suitable in more recent literature, where 
contagion is the transmission of shocks from one country to others or the cross-
country correlation, beyond what would be explained by fundamentals or 
common shocks.11 This deﬁnition is usually referred to as excessco-movement,12 
commonly explained by herding behavior.  
The very restrictive deﬁnition: it implies an increase in the linkages after a 
crisis, when cross-country correlations increase during “crisis times” relative to 
correlations during “tranquil times”, therefore, this can only be due to factors 
unrelated to fundamentals, since they cannot change in a short period of time 
(Gentile & Giordano, 2012, 2013). In fact, Dornbusch et al. (2000) and Forbes and 
Rigobon (2002) argue that contagion is a significant increase in cross-market co-
movements after a  (negative) shock to one country (or group of countries).13  
Forbes and Rigobon (2001) reinforce that this notion of contagion excludes a 
constant high degree of co-movement in a crisis period, otherwise markets would 
be just interdependent.14 There is contagion only if cross-market co-movements 
increase significantly after the shock. 15 Any continued high level of market 
correlation suggests strong linkages between the two economies that exist in all 
states of the world. 
Currently this very restrictive definition reveals two major advantages: firstly, 
it provides a straightforward framework for testing whether contagion occurs or 
not by comparing co-movements between two markets (such as cross-market 
                                                          
11 Fundamentals causes of contagion include macroeconomic shocks that have repercussions on an 
international scale and local shocks transmitted through trade links, competitive devaluations, and 
ﬁnancial links (Gentile & Giordano, 2012, 2013). 
12 That means a correlation that remains even after controlling for fundamentals and common 
shocks. Herding behavior is usually said to be responsible for co-movement beyond that what is 
explained by fundamentals linkages (Gentile & Giordano, 2012). 
13 This definition is known sometimes as “shift-contagion”. Our definition of “shift-contagion” 
following Gentile and Giordano (2012), relies on a significant increase in cross-market co-
movements after a shock, which is not related with fundamentals linkages (such as financial, real or 
political). The only transmission channel that could explain contagion is the behavioral one. 
14 Regarding the extreme definition of contagion phenomenon, for instance, the research of Bae et 
al. (2000; 2003) consider extreme return shocks across countries as evidence for contagion. 
15 A contagious event cannot occur in the absence of a shock, indicating that a large shock should 
occur (Caporin et al., 2013; Constancio, 2012). 
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correlations coefficients) during a relatively stable period with co-movements 
immediately after a shock or crisis, which does not require a specification of a 
structural representation for stock returns. Secondly, it allows distinguishing 
between permanent and temporal mechanisms of crises transmission. Identifying 
if the propagation of a crisis is due to permanent or temporal mechanisms has 
important implications for designing public policy responses (Bejarano-Bejarano 
et al., 2015). 
This empirical research uses the very restrictive definition of contagion, 
because it provides an alternative explanation for transmission of crisis, namely 
interdependence, allowing one to answer the questions: Is there contagion or 
interdependence? Do the periods of highly correlated market movements provide 
evidence of contagion? Does the cross-market relationship change during periods 
of crisis? Our main goal is to try to answer these questions in the context of both 
crises (LBBC and ESDC) from the perspective of the BRICS countries stock markets. 
2.3. Causes and Transmission of Contagion 
The literature divides the concept of contagion into two broad categories 
(Bonga-Bonga, 2015; Dornbusch et al., 2000; Forbes & Rigobon, 2001; Masson, 
1998; Pritsker, 2000), namely, fundamentals-based 16  and investor-behavior 
contagions.17 The first category emphasizes spillovers that result from the normal 
interdependence among market economies, referring to the transmission of 
shocks that is due to real and financial linkages or fundamentals relationship of 
any kind, such as trade or macroeconomic policies, between countries. These 
forms of co-movements would not indicate contagion, according to the restrictive 
and very restrictive definition of contagion, which is adopted in this research. 
According to Gentile and Giordano (2012), fundamentals linkages cannot change 
suddenly in a few months after a shock has occurred. Hence, that is considered 
interdependence. 
                                                          
16 Macroeconomics Causes: common shocks, trade links and competitive devaluations, real and 
ﬁnancial links and macroeconomic policies (Claessens et al., 2001; Dornbusch et al., 2000). 
Fundamentals-based contagion is caused by “monsoonal eﬀects” and “linkages”. Monsoonal eﬀects 
– are random aggregate shocks that hit a number of countries in a similar way (such as a major 
economic shift in industrial countries, a signiﬁcant change in oil prices or changes in US interest 
rates) that may adversely aﬀect the economic fundamentals of several economies simultaneously 
and, therefore, may cause a crisis (Eichengreen et al. 1996; Masson, 1998). Linkages – are normal 
interdependencies, such as those produced by trade and ﬁnancial relations between countries and 
which can easily become a carrier of crisis (Kaminsky & Reinhart, 2000; Masson, 1998).  
17 Liquidity problems, information asymmetries and costs, multiple equilibriums and changes in the 
rules of the game (see Claessens et al., 2001; Dornbusch et al., 2000). 
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The second category involves a financial crisis that is not linked to observed 
changes in macroeconomics or other fundamentals but is solely the result of a 
change in investor behavior which alters the flow of international portfolio 
investments in such a manner that it cannot be explained by economic 
fundamentals. For example, a crisis in one emerging market country can trigger 
investors to withdraw funds from many emerging markets without taking into 
account the fundamental economic differences between them18(Bonga-Bonga, 
2015). If the transmission force is based on the irrational behavior of the market 
agents, known as “irrational” phenomena,19 then even countries with good 
fundamentals can be seriously affected, in this case we have contagion. 
The initial literature has generally been divided as to whether transmission 
through real or financial channels constitutes contagion. Forbes and Rigobon 
(2001, 2002) and Gentile and Giordano (2012) argue that the theoretical literature 
of contagion could be split into two groups: crisis-contingent and non-crisis-
contingent theories.20 The first one is related to the financial linkages, explaining 
why transmission mechanisms change during a crisis and therefore why a shock 
leads to an increase in the cross-market linkages. On the other hand, the second 
one is related to the real linkages, if transmission mechanisms are the same 
during a crisis as during more stable periods, and therefore cross-market linkages 
do not change (increase) after a shock. Theories belonging to the second group 
may be interpreted as interdependence rather than contagion (see Forbes & 
Rigobon, 2002; Gentile & Giordano, 2012). 
2.4. Contagion: Testing and Measurement 
Gentile and Giordano (2012, 2013) describe contagion as the amount of co-
movement among asset prices which exceeds what is explained by fundamentals, 
since fundamentals cannot change in a few months. They argue that a degree of 
                                                          
18 This event is known as “Fight-to-quality phenomenon” and refers to a sudden shift in investment 
behaviors in a period of ﬁnancial turmoil where investors try to sell assets perceived as risky and 
instead purchase safe assets. An important feature of ﬂight-to-quality is an insuﬃcient risk taking 
behavior by investors. Though excessive risk taking can be a source of ﬁnancial crisis, insuﬃcient risk 
taking can severely dislocate credit and other ﬁnancial markets during the ﬁnancial crisis. These 
shifts in portfolio investments result in further negative shocks to the ﬁnancial sector. In accordance 
to this phenomenon demand for 10-year US Treasuries and gold increased during the recent 
ﬁnancial turmoil (Kazi & Wagan, 2014). 
19 This can occur in the form of speculative attacks, ﬁnancial panics, herd behavior, loss of 
conﬁdence, and increased risk aversion (Gentile & Giordano, 2012, 2013). 
20 Crisis-Contingent Theories: multiple equilibria, endogenous liquidity shocks, political contagion 
and random global monetary shocks. Non-Crisis-Contingent Theories: trade, policy coordination, 
country reevaluation and random real global shocks. 
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extreme connection or asymmetry that goes beyond interdependencies must be 
present in order for contagion to be present.  
Research on contagion range from testing conditional correlation to 
contagion of bond spreads, sovereign ratings, credit default swaps (CDS) spreads, 
stock market returns, diﬀerences in interest rates, common trends and cycles, 
monetary policy and currency market (Bianconi et al., 2013; Caporin et al., 2013; 
Fourie & Botha, 2015; Gentile & Giordano, 2012, 2013, Gomez-Puig & Sosvilla-
Rivero, 2011, 2014; Matos et al., 2015). For instance, Andenmatten and Brill 
(2011), following Forbes and Rigobon (2002) methodology, also performed a 
bivariate test for contagion to examine whether the co-movement of sovereign 
CDS premium increased signiﬁcantly after the beginning of Greek debt crisis in 
October 2009. Their ﬁndings revealed that in European countries, both contagion 
and interdependence occurred. In addition, Baig and Goldfajn (1999) in the 
context of the Asian crisis, using the same methodology, performed a cross-
market correlation for exchange rates, stock returns, interest rates, and sovereign 
bond spreads. The ﬁndings for sovereign spreads highlighted strong evidence of 
contagion and high correlation among exchange rate, stock returns and interest 
rates co-movements. They conclude that spreads directly reﬂecting the risk 
perception of ﬁnancial markets, indicating that pure contagion may be the result 
of the behavior of investors or other ﬁnancial agents (Claessens et al., 2001).  
Bonga-Bonga (2015) provides evidence of contagion phenomenon by 
analyzing ﬁnancial contagion between South Africa and its BRICS equity market 
from December 1996 to May 2012, the initial period corresponds with the 
liberalization of a number of BRICS equity markets. By applying a conditional 
correlation framework, they ﬁnd evidence of cross-transmission and dependence 
between South Africa and Brazil. Furthermore, the research also ascertained that 
South Africa is more aﬀected by crises originating from China, India and Russia 
than these countries are by crises from South Africa. Furthermore, Matos et al. 
(2015) performed a test to identify common trends and cycles between BRIC’s 
stock markets, providing evidence of contagion eﬀect, with Brazil and China 
ﬁnancial markets playing a leading role in the transmission of contagion. They 
conclude that worldwide investors should consider reactions in Chinese and 
Brazilian markets during a crisis as a predictor of other BRIC reactions through the 
contagion channel.21 
                                                          
21 Trade, banks/lending institutions, portfolio investors and wake-up calls/fundamentals 
reassessment (Forbes, 2012). 
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A wide range of empirical techniques has been used to quantify contagion in 
the literature. For instance, Forbes (2012) refers tools to measure contagion range 
from cross-market correlations analysis (Forbes & Rigobon, 2001, 2002) to 
probability analysis (Constancio, 2012; Eichengreen et al., 1996; Gomez-Puig & 
Sosvilla-Rivero, 2011, 2014) to latent factor/GARCH models (Bekaert et al., 2011, 
2005; Dungey & Yalama, 2010) to extreme values/co-exceedance/jump (Bae et al., 
2003; Berger & Pukthuanthong, 2012; Boyer et al., 2006; Forbes, 2012) and VAR 
models (Beirne & Gieck, 2012; Fourie & Botha, 2015; Matos et al., 2015).  
More related to our approach, Boubaker et al. (2016) use VAR-VECM to 
measure contagion between US stock market and developed and emerging stock 
markets during the Subprime crisis in September 2008. They provided signiﬁcant 
evidence of contagion eﬀects between the US stock market and the developed 
and emerging equity markets after the global ﬁnancial crisis. Beirne and Gieck 
(2012) use a global VAR to measure interdependence and contagion across bonds, 
stocks and currencies for over 60 economies during periods of crisis. Their analysis 
reveals that shocks to equity markets typically originate in the US and that bond 
market shocks tend to originate in the Eurozone. Gentile and Giordano (2012, 
2013) use cointegration and VECM/Granger causality tests to measure the 
existence and direction of contagion in European countries during the LBBC and 
ESDC, pointing out the occurrence of contagion phenomenon in both crises. 
Fourie and Botha (2015) using the same methodology provided by Gentile and 
Giordano (2012, 2013), but for sovereign ratings, proved contagion in European 
countries, during the two recent windows of crises: Lehman Crisis and European 
Union Sovereign Debt Crisis. 
3. Data 
Our main objective is to test for contagion during the last two international 
ﬁnancial crises,22 using an important ﬁnancial market indicator: The Stock Market 
Index (SMI). Further on, we apply a tree-step econometric analysis23 to test for 
contagion that will be discussed in detail later. We will analyze the diﬀerent 
connections and co-movement between countries to identify any cross-market or 
cross-country connections that can explain and assess contagion phenomena in 
the BRICS stock markets.  
                                                          
22 The recent Lehman Brother bankruptcy Crisis (LBBC) and the European Sovereign Debt Crisis 
(ESDC). 
23  First: A bivariate dynamic cointegration analysis. Second: Granger causality test and 
VECM/GonzaloGranger statistic.Third: We apply the Variance decomposition method following Baig 
and Goldfajn (1999), Beirne and Gieck (2012), Gentile and Giordano (2012, 2013), Fourie and Botha 
(2015) and Boubaker et al. (2016). 
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Morgan Stanley Capital International (MSCI) for large-caps is the main source 
used for stock price indices. The sample consists of ﬁve countries from the 
Emerging Markets known as BRICS: (Brazil (BRA), Russia (RUS), India (IND), China 
(CHI) and South Africa (SAF)) and one developed country, the United States (USA), 
using daily stock indices closing prices for each country. The daily frequency 
sample was considered, because interdependence phenomena can explode in a 
few days. So, if we had considered weekly or monthly data, we could have lost the 
measurement of interactions (innovations), which may last only a few days 
(Gentile & Giordano, 2012, 2013; Jin & An, 2016; Voronkova, 2004).  
Table 1. Variables Explanation 
Variables Explanation Type 
BRA Log-level value of MSCI Brazil Stock Price Index Exog./Endogenous 
RUS Log-level value of MSCI Russia Stock Price Index Exog./Endogenous 
IND Log-level value of MSCI India Stock Price Index Exog./Endogenous 
CHI Log-level value of MSCI China Stock Price Index Exog./Endogenous 
SAF Log-level value of MSCI S. Africa Stock Price Index Exog./Endogenous 
USA Log-level value of MSCI U. States Stock Price Index Exogenous 
Notes: Regarding to national holidays, the index level was assumed to stay the same as that on the 
previous trading day. The USA variable is implicitly imputed in the data, because as it is stated in the 
literature that linkage patterns may be distorted when the inﬂuence of the US market is not taken 
into consideration (see Bekaert et al., 2011; Gentile & Giordano, 2012, 2013; Khalid & Kawai, 2003; 
Yang et al. 2003). 
The daily stock indices (in log-level) were presented also through graphical 
representation over the period of the study (see Appendix A). Visually, all indices 
were recovering jointly from 2003 until the beginning of the 2008 as a period of 
economic growth that lasting until 2007. But subsequently, the USA subprime 
mortgage crisis, undermined the conﬁdence of banks in each other’s solvability 
decreased sharply leading to the breakdown of the interbank lending market and 
turmoil on the ﬁnancial marketing the second half of 2007. Large downturns in 
stock prices followed and the interconnectedness of stock market indices rose 
again as all markets suﬀered from similarly intensive losses. Hence, after April 
2008 until the insolvency of Lehman Brothers in September 2008, stock markets’ 
tendencies started to move jointly (see Appendix A).  
Regarding daily data, it is necessary to consider the diﬀerences in time zones 
and in trading hours of the exchanges when interpreting the results. Therefore, 
we considered a central time window around the two crises (LBBC and ESDC) as 
D.Pereira / JEFA Vol:2 No:1 (2018) 1-44  
Page | 12  
 
suggested by Jin and An (2016). A two-day rolling average, as suggested by Forbes 
and Rigobon (2002) to account for time synchronization of diﬀerent markets, 
which lay in diﬀerent time zones has not been considered in this research due to 
severe autocorrelation problem as highlighted by Chiang et al. (2007) and Ahmad 
et al. (2013). 
3.1. Variable Transformation 
We took natural logarithms of our data before proceeding to the analysis 
process (see table 1). The log form of stock indices were used in order to reduce 
the heteroskedasticity present in the data (Singh & Kaur, 2016), smoothing out 
the ﬂuctuations, to make the data series linear and very helpful for the purpose of 
further analysis (Verma & Rani, 2016). Moreover, for evaluating the rate of daily 
returns needed for further analysis, the initially log-level variables were taken and 
calculated (Ahmad et al., 2013; Malliaris & Urrutia, 1992; Mensah & Alagidede, 
2017; Pragidis & Chionis, 2014; Syriopoulos et al. 2015) on the following basis: 
𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡 = [log(𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡) − log(𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡−1) × 100] =  �log � 𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡−1� × 100�                             (eq. 1) 
where, 𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡  is the percentage daily returns value at time 𝑡𝑡, 𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡  and 𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡−1, are the 
percentage daily returns value at two successive days: 𝑡𝑡 and 𝑡𝑡 − 1, respectively.  
After the transformation, the percentage daily stock return variables were 
defined as: SRBRA, SRRUS, SRIND, SRCHI, SRSAF and SRUSA. Daily closing prices of 
the BRICS stock markets were retrieved from Thomson Reuters Datastream 
database and are expressed in US dollars,24 and the time range of the time series 
goes from January 1, 2003 to October 31, 2016.25 Eviews 9.0 and R programming26 
were used for arranging the data and implementation of econometric analyses. 
4. Methodology 
In order to test for contagion, we implemented a three-step methodology 
coherent with our deﬁnition of contagion as a signiﬁcant increase of cross-market 
linkages after a shock to one country or a group of countries based on both crises 
(LBBC and ESDC). This methodology will provide three diﬀerent indicators that 
                                                          
24 Using US dollars avoid problems related to the local currency (See Bekaert & Harvey, 1995; Chen 
et al., 2002; Mollah et al., 2014; Roll, 1992; Singh & Kaur, 2016). 
25 Data was set in the begin of 2003 to avoid contamination in the stock market from earlier bond 
crises in Russia and Latin America (Cronin et al., 2016, p. 6). 
26 The OPTMALAG command from R programing, chooses the lag order that maximize Johansen 
statistics.  
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together corroborate to assess contagion phenomenon in the BRICS stock 
markets.  
As first step, we implement the Johansen cointegration test to detect the 
cross-market connections in the long-run, allowing the identiﬁcation of signs of 
contagion and the detection of the so called “Contagion Windows” by looking 
direct in the data without any kind of previous assumptions. We use a bivariate 
dynamic cointegration analysis 27  to test for the presence of new long-run 
relationship among BRICS countries through the application of the dynamic rolling 
cointegration analysis28 (rolling indicator) for each pair of countries. Any increase 
of the percentage of cointegrated countries over the total number of possible 
pairs signals a shift29 of the shock transmission channels and represents the first 
indicator of potential contagion. According to the results obtained in this step, it is 
possible to detect contagion windows by looking directly into the data, finding 
evidence which either confirms or rejects the assumption of the time periods 
during which the contagion process could have started to propagate during the 
two financial crises analyzed – LBBC and ESDC.  
In order to determine the number of cointegrating equations, a VECM(k) was 
applied according to Johansen (1988), 
∆𝑋𝑋𝑡𝑡 = 𝜂𝜂𝑥𝑥 + �𝜆𝜆𝑥𝑥 ,𝑖𝑖∆𝑋𝑋𝑡𝑡−𝑖𝑖𝑘𝑘
𝑖𝑖=1 + �𝜃𝜃𝑥𝑥 ,𝑖𝑖∆𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡−𝑖𝑖𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖=1 + 𝛼𝛼1𝛽𝛽′ �𝑋𝑋𝑡𝑡−1𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡−1 � + 𝜖𝜖𝑥𝑥 ,𝑡𝑡  
∆𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡 = 𝜑𝜑𝑦𝑦 + �𝜆𝜆𝑦𝑦 ,𝑖𝑖∆𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡−𝑖𝑖𝑘𝑘
𝑖𝑖=1 + �𝜃𝜃𝑦𝑦 ,𝑖𝑖∆𝑋𝑋𝑡𝑡−𝑖𝑖𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖=1 + 𝛼𝛼2𝛽𝛽′ �𝑋𝑋𝑡𝑡−1𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡−1 � + 𝜖𝜖𝑦𝑦 ,𝑡𝑡             (𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒. 2) 
where, ∆𝑋𝑋𝑡𝑡  and ∆𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡  are daily changes of stock returns referred to markets X and Y 
, 𝑋𝑋𝑡𝑡  and 𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡  are the correspondent log-price indices (in log-level). The long-run 
impact matrix can be expressed as Π = 𝛼𝛼𝛽𝛽′ , where α′ = [𝛼𝛼1,𝛼𝛼2], and �𝜖𝜖𝑥𝑥 , 𝜖𝜖𝑦𝑦� is a 
vector of white noise processes. The vector of coefficient 𝛽𝛽  contains the 
parameters of the common stochastic, trend, while 𝛼𝛼1 and 𝛼𝛼2 measure the speed 
of convergence. In particular, 𝛽𝛽′ �
𝑋𝑋𝑡𝑡−1
𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡−1 � represents a common stochastic trend 
                                                          
27 To individuate significant connections among pairs of markets, the bivariate Johansen 
cointegration test is applied to allows the identification of relations between pairs of markets which 
lead to slow price adjustment processes – long-run connections (Gentile and Giordano 2012, 2013). 
28 See the recent contributions of Mylonidis and Kollias (2010), Arce et al. (2012), Peri and Baldi 
(2013) and Ludwig (2014). 
29 We defined “shift” as a significant increase in cross-market co-movements after a shock, not 
related with fundamentals links (Gentile and Giordano, 2012). 
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towards which price dynamic slowly converges. Hence, the Johansen 
cointegration test mainly relies on the assumption that the rank of Π equals the 
number of cointegrating vectors. If the matrix Π has a rank r, there are r 
cointegrating relations. When r = 0, there is no long-run relation among 
international markets and the equation 2 would be reduced to a VAR(k). 
Now, for detecting possible periods of contagion, the above dynamic 
Johansen cointegration test is applied between all the possible pairs of countries 
with a rolling window of 1000-days,30 by computing at each step t(t, represents 
each month) of the procedure the following rolling indicator of cross-country 
connections: 
�
𝑃𝑃𝑒𝑒𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑒𝑒𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑒𝑒 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 
𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑜𝑜𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 − 𝐶𝐶𝑜𝑜𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡𝑃𝑃𝑦𝑦 𝐶𝐶𝑜𝑜𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑒𝑒𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶�𝑡𝑡= � # 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑜𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 − 𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃 𝑃𝑃𝑒𝑒𝑙𝑙𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶
𝑀𝑀𝑃𝑃𝑥𝑥. # 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝐿𝐿𝑜𝑜𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 − 𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃 𝑃𝑃𝑒𝑒𝑙𝑙𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶 𝑃𝑃𝑎𝑎𝑜𝑜𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 𝑃𝑃𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙 𝑃𝑃𝑜𝑜𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒𝐶𝐶 ∗ 100�          𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒. 3 
Using the rolling indicator in equation 3, it is possible to discriminate as follows: 
 Crisis periods are identified recording the highest values of cross-country 
connections. 
 Tranquil periods are identified recording the lowest values of cross-
country connections. 
By comparing these highest and lowest percentage values, it may be possible 
to either confirm or reject the assumption made regarding the timing of the two 
crises episodes investigated: Contagion occurs when cross-country co-movements 
(percentage of cointegrated countries, known as cross- country connections), 
increase during the crisis periods relative to cross-country connections during the 
tranquil periods. 
As second step, through the Granger causality test and Vector Error 
Correction Model (VECM)/Gonzalo-Granger statistic, which capture new 
signiﬁcant short connections among the BRICS countries after a ﬁnancial shock, 
allowing also the identiﬁcation of which country propagates the impulses of 
contagion – leading countries and which country is the target of contagion – 
follower countries.  
                                                          
30 The length of 1000 days-window is chosen in order to make the cointegration results more robust, 
allowing to explore the asymptotic properties of the Johannsen test (Gentile and Giordano, 2012, 
2013). Further, in the presence of autocorrelation coefficients, the power of the trace test is as low 
as the nominal size for a window length of 250 days and becomes acceptable for windows of at least 
1000 days – four years (Ludwig, 2014, 19). 
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The Granger causality test provides evidence for short-run relationship 
among BRICS countries. Alongside with cointegration technique (long-run 
relationship), it allows one to find out which country has a dominant role in the 
contagion process, being able to influence others “leading country” and it allows 
one to identify the most fragile country, in other words, it is possible to identify 
the reaction of this country related to other countries’ price innovations “follower 
country”. 
 
Figure 1. Framework implementation of the Granger Causality Methodology 
In order to apply the Granger causality test, the following considerations 
were taken into account: first, the time series were tested for unit root in each 
sub-period established in the first step followed by the cointegration test among 
pairs of countries. Second, the results of unit root test applied earlier revealed 
that all the time series are nonstationary at log-level. However, the series are 
stationary at their first difference (I(0)), that is, all the series are integrated of 
Order one (I(1)). Based on these results, if the series are found to be (I(1)) and not 
cointegrated,31 the causality test proceeded according to the following equations: 
∆𝑋𝑋𝑡𝑡 = 𝛼𝛼𝑥𝑥 + �𝛽𝛽𝑥𝑥 ,𝑖𝑖∆𝑋𝑋𝑡𝑡−𝑖𝑖𝑘𝑘
𝑖𝑖=1 + �𝜃𝜃𝑥𝑥 ,𝑖𝑖∆𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡−𝑖𝑖𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖=1 + 𝜖𝜖𝑥𝑥 ,𝑡𝑡                   
∆𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡 = 𝛼𝛼𝑦𝑦 + �𝛽𝛽𝑦𝑦 ,𝑖𝑖∆𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡−𝑖𝑖𝑘𝑘
𝑖𝑖=1 + �𝜃𝜃𝑦𝑦 ,𝑖𝑖∆𝑋𝑋𝑡𝑡−𝑖𝑖𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖=1 + 𝜖𝜖𝑦𝑦 ,𝑡𝑡                                (𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒. 4) 
However, if the series are found to be (I(1)) and cointegrated, causality test 
will be tested based on equation 5. For cointegrated series, different approaches 
to causality testing have to be applied. Based on results of Sims et al. (1990), 
Demetriades and Hussein (1996) argue that test statistics derived from a level VAR 
framework are not valid unless the variables employed are either (I(0)) or (I(1)) 
and cointegrated. This assumption drives the causality test for equation 4 if the 
series are not cointegrated. 
                                                          
31 The Equation 4 is only valid if the series are not cointegrated (MacDonald and Kearney, 1987). 
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On the other hand, Engle and Granger (1987) and Granger (1988) argue that 
in the presence of cointegration, causality tests derived from the cointegration 
relationship, which ignore the ECT, are misspecified and suggest the re-
parameterization of the model in the equivalent error correction model form 
(VECM). Therefore, the causality test in this case is conducted in the following 
equations: 
∆𝑋𝑋𝑡𝑡 = 𝛼𝛼𝑥𝑥 + �𝛽𝛽𝑥𝑥 ,𝑖𝑖∆𝑋𝑋𝑡𝑡−𝑖𝑖𝑘𝑘
𝑖𝑖=1 + �𝜃𝜃𝑥𝑥 ,𝑖𝑖∆𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡−𝑖𝑖𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖=1 + 𝜙𝜙𝑥𝑥𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶𝐸𝐸𝑥𝑥 ,𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝜖𝜖𝑥𝑥 ,𝑡𝑡                
∆𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡 = 𝛼𝛼𝑦𝑦 + �𝛽𝛽𝑦𝑦 ,𝑖𝑖∆𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡−𝑖𝑖𝑘𝑘
𝑖𝑖=1 + �𝜃𝜃𝑦𝑦 ,𝑖𝑖∆𝑋𝑋𝑡𝑡−𝑖𝑖𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖=1 + 𝜙𝜙𝑦𝑦𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶𝐸𝐸𝑦𝑦 ,𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝜖𝜖𝑦𝑦 ,𝑡𝑡                 (𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒. 5) 
The VECM-based test allows the differentiation between two types of 
causality: the short-run dynamics of the VAR and the disequilibrium adjustment of 
the error correction mechanism (ECM). Indeed, the F-test on the estimated 
coefficients θi provides evidence regarding a short-term adjustment dynamics. 
The t-test of the estimated coefficient φ provides evidence for the existence of an 
arbitrage type error correction mechanism that drives the variables back to their 
long-term equilibrium relationship that is embodied in the cointegration vector. In 
this step, the objective is to identify the creation of new short-run relations 
among countries as evidence of contagion (θi), conducting the Granger causality 
test separately for each contagion window (sub-periods defined in the first step) 
based on the stock returns of all countries. Regarding the lag length k,32 the 
criteria is chosen in order to generate a white noise error term 𝜖𝜖𝑡𝑡 . 
We analyze the contagion windows deﬁned in the previous step, looking for 
changes in the short-run connections between countries. Hence, changes in the 
connections detected after a crisis period is a signal of shocks transmission 
through countries and consequently, a signal of contagion. Moreover, together 
with the short-run versus33 of the connections, the detection of the long-run 
versus of the countries connections is also very important and reached by 
implementing the Gonzalo-Granger statistic, allowing the identification of the 
                                                          
32 The criteria information is given by the Akaike information criterion (AIC), the Schwartz 
information criterion (SIC), the Hannan-Quinn criterion (HQ) and the Likelihood ratio statistic (LR). In 
this research, the SIC is preferable only when the serial correlation is not an issue. Otherwise, the 
preferable criterion will be the one that guarantees no serial correlation. 
33 The versus of the long-run (cointegrated analysis) is two types of causality: short-run connections 
obtained by the Granger causality test and the long-run causality, which is obtained in the context of 
the cointegration analysis based on the first step and it is applied in the Gonzalo-Granger statistic. 
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direction of connections in the crisis episodes. In order to detect the direction of 
the long-run causality among BRICS countries, we apply Gonzalo and Granger 
(1995) methodology34 to identify the direction through which adjustment is done. 
Hence, it is possible to estimate which country is the leader and which is the 
follower in the contagion transmission in the context of a bivariate cointegration 
analysis (Engle and Granger, 1987). Furthermore, we can measure the speed of 
convergence to the long-run equilibrium (α) of the two hypothesized countries, 
while (β) contains the parameters of the common stochastic trend (Gentile and 
Giordano, 2012, 2013). 
Gonzalo and Granger’s model of price-discovery is based on the following 
VECM specification given by Arce et al. (2012), adapted to our context (with USA 
stock return as a exogenous variable): 
�
∆𝑋𝑋𝑡𝑡
𝑘𝑘
∆𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡
𝑗𝑗 � = 𝜈𝜈0 + 𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶𝐸𝐸 + 𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈 +
⎣
⎢
⎢
⎡� 𝜆𝜆1,𝑖𝑖∆𝑋𝑋𝑡𝑡−𝑖𝑖𝑘𝑘𝑝𝑝
𝑖𝑖=1
� 𝛿𝛿2,𝑖𝑖∆𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡−𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑝𝑝
𝑖𝑖=1 ⎦⎥
⎥
⎤ +
⎣
⎢
⎢
⎡� 𝛿𝛿1,𝑖𝑖∆𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡−𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑝𝑝
𝑖𝑖=1
� 𝜆𝜆2,𝑖𝑖∆𝑋𝑋𝑡𝑡−𝑖𝑖𝑘𝑘𝑝𝑝
𝑖𝑖=1 ⎦⎥
⎥
⎤ + �𝐶𝐶1,𝑡𝑡𝐶𝐶2,𝑡𝑡 �             (𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒. 6) 
The above empirical model is a VAR system formed by two equations defined 
from the vector, which includes 𝑋𝑋𝑡𝑡𝑘𝑘  and 𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡
𝑗𝑗  as the pair of BRICS stocks markets, 
k,j=Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa (k ≠ j); and an error correction term 
(ECT) defined by the expression 𝛼𝛼(𝑋𝑋𝑡𝑡−1𝑘𝑘 − 𝛽𝛽2𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡−𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗 − 𝛽𝛽3𝑍𝑍𝑡𝑡−1𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈 − 𝛽𝛽4) , where 𝛽𝛽2, 𝛽𝛽3 and 
𝛽𝛽4 are estimated in an auxiliary cointegration regression and the parameter vector 
α′ = (𝛼𝛼1,𝛼𝛼2) contains the error correction coefficients measuring each price’s 
expected speed of adjustment. Furthermore, the exogenous variable (USA) is 
defined by the expression ∑ 𝜈𝜈𝑖𝑖𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈∆𝑍𝑍𝑡𝑡−𝑖𝑖𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈
𝑝𝑝
𝑖𝑖=1 . The estimation of the VECM equation is 
restricted to the existence of a cointegration relation between the stock market 
from both pair of countries. This cointegration relation appears in the ECT as (𝑋𝑋𝑡𝑡−1𝑘𝑘 − 𝛽𝛽2𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡−𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗 − 𝛽𝛽3𝑍𝑍𝑡𝑡−1𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈 − 𝛽𝛽4) . The parameters  𝜆𝜆1,𝑖𝑖 , 𝜆𝜆2,𝑖𝑖 , 𝛿𝛿1,𝑖𝑖 , 𝛿𝛿2,𝑖𝑖  and 
𝜐𝜐′ = (𝜐𝜐1,𝑖𝑖 , 𝜐𝜐2,𝑖𝑖) for i=1,...p, with p indicating the total number of lags, contain the 
coefficients of the VAR system that measure the effect of the lagged first 
difference in the pair of stocks from BRICS countries markets based on the first 
                                                          
34 The method proposed by Gonzalo and Granger (1995) decomposes the time series Xt as: 
𝑋𝑋𝑡𝑡 = 𝛼𝛼(𝛽𝛽′𝛼𝛼)𝛽𝛽′𝑋𝑋𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽⊥(𝛼𝛼⊥′ 𝛽𝛽⊥)−1𝛼𝛼⊥𝑋𝑋𝑡𝑡   where first component is (I(0)) and the transitory part, while 
the second component is (I(1)) and the permanent part (see Gonzalo and Granger, 1995, Equation 
11). The decomposition of the [Xt, Yt] into two components (transitory and permanent), allow the 
obtainment of different kind of information. For example, policymakers may be primarily interested 
in the trend (permanent component) behavior, but those concerned with business cycles are more 
interested in the cyclical component (transitory component). Moreover, singling out the common 
factors allow us to investigate how they are related to other variables (Gonzalo and Granger, 1995). 
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difference of such stocks at time t. Finally, ut denotes a White noise vector 
𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 ∽ 𝑁𝑁(0,1). 
The price-discovery for the pair of stocks from the BRICS markets, denoted by 
𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑋𝑋𝑘𝑘  and 𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑌𝑌𝑗𝑗 , respectively, can then be constructed from the elements of the 
vector α′ , which contains the coefficients that determine each market’s 
contribution to price-discovery: 
𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑋𝑋𝑘𝑘 = 𝛼𝛼2(𝛼𝛼2 − 𝛼𝛼1)                             𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑌𝑌𝑗𝑗 = −𝛼𝛼1(𝛼𝛼2 − 𝛼𝛼1)                            𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒. (7) 
Given that �𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑋𝑋𝑘𝑘 + 𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑌𝑌𝑗𝑗 � = 1, we would conclude that the 𝑋𝑋𝑘𝑘(𝑌𝑌𝑗𝑗 ) market 
leads the price-discovery process whenever 𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑋𝑋𝑘𝑘  is higher (lower) than 0.5. The 
intuition for this is the faster the speed in eliminating the price difference from 
the long-term equilibrium attributable to a given stock market, the higher the 
corresponding α according equation 6, and the higher the price discovery (Arce et 
al. 2012). 
At this point, we adapted the equation 7 to the view of Gentile and Giordano 
(2012, 2013), for instance, assuming a pair of countries, as in the first step, the 
long-run coefficients matrix Π in equation 2 can be expressed as Π = 𝛼𝛼𝛽𝛽′ , where 
𝛼𝛼 measures the speed of convergence to the long-run equilibrium of the two 
hypothesized countries, while  𝛽𝛽  contains the parameters of the common 
stochastic trend. Furthermore, following equation 4, if the parameter of the speed 
adjustment of the first country (𝛼𝛼1) is statistically not significant, while the 
parameter of the speed adjustment of the second country (𝛼𝛼2) is positive and 
significant, it means that the adjustment process towards the long-term 
relationship is determined by changes to the variable of the second country in 
response to changes of the variable of the first country, indicating that the leading 
role in the contagion transmission is played by the first country. Otherwise, if (𝛼𝛼1) 
is negative and statistically significant, while (𝛼𝛼2) is not significant, this implies 
that the second country plays the leading role. However, when both countries are 
significant35, both countries contribute to the contagion transmission process and 
the Gonzalo-Granger statistic, defined as � 𝛼𝛼2(𝛼𝛼2−𝛼𝛼1)′ �, allows one to determine 
which country makes the greatest contribution to the contagion transmission 
process. Hence, if the application of the ratio in equation 7 for the first stock 
market exceeds 0.5, the price of the first country plays a more important role, 
while if it is lower than 0.5, the price of the second country plays a bigger role in 
the contagion transmission (Arce et al. 2012; Gentile and Giordano 2012). 
                                                          
35 In that case, there is a shift of signals (Gentile and Giordano 2012, 2013). 
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Third and the last step is dedicated to the rate of involvement indicator, 
which identiﬁes the most vulnerable countries, measuring how much of the 
domestic risk is explained by innovations in other BRICS countries. We apply the 
forecast-error variance decomposition (FEVD) to test for the exposure to external 
shocks as a degree of vulnerability of each country. Indicating that, as far as the 
proportion of the movements explained by other countries increases, the 
vulnerability of the system also increases and becomes more exposed to external 
shocks (more exposed to external markets). Following the conceptual framework 
discussed previously, at this point, our assumption is that contagion occurs every 
time the degree of vulnerability of one country – measured as the fraction of its 
movements due to an other country’s shocks – increases after a crisis period. In 
other words, an increasing degree of vulnerability after a crisis period is 
considered as evidence of contagion. 
The FEVD, looking from the econometric point of view, measures the fraction 
of the forecast-error variance of an endogenous variable that can be attributed to 
orthogonalized shocks themselves or to another endogenous variable, giving the 
portion of the movements in the dependent variables that are due to their “own” 
shocks, versus shocks to the other variables.36 
Initially, the FEVD indicator is given by the moving-average representation of 
the VECM as follows: 
𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡 = �𝐶𝐶(𝐶𝐶)𝐶𝐶(𝑡𝑡 − 𝐶𝐶)∞
𝐶𝐶=0                                                                            𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒. (8) 
where, the i, j − th component of C(s) represents the impulse-response of the i − 
th country in s periods to a shock of one standard error in the j − th country, and u 
is the orthogonalized innovation in the sense that it has an identity covariance 
matrix. Initiating from this mathematical representation of the stock return, the 
variance of the n − step forward forecast variance of the i − th return time series 
�𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡+𝑃𝑃� is given as follows: 
𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖(𝑃𝑃)2 = �𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖,1(𝑗𝑗)2𝑃𝑃
𝑗𝑗=1 + … + �𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖,𝑁𝑁(𝑗𝑗)2𝑃𝑃𝑗𝑗=1                                           𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒. (9) 
                                                          
36 A shock to the i − th variable will directly affect that variable; however, it will also be transmitted 
to all other variables in the system through the dynamic structure of the VAR. Variance 
decompositions determine how much of the s-step-forward forecast error variance of a given 
variable is explained by innovations to each other explanatory variables for s = 1, 2, 3, . . . , T. 
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where, N is the number of countries included in the sample (N = 5)37. For each 
country stock market i the ratio: 
𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖(𝑘𝑘) = ∑ 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖,𝑘𝑘(𝑗𝑗)2𝑃𝑃𝑗𝑗=1𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖(𝑃𝑃)2                                                                            𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒. (10) 
represents the portion of movements in country i due to shocks from country k, 
on the time horizon n. Therefore, for [i = k] the ratio is as follows: 
𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖(𝑖𝑖) = ∑ 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖(𝑗𝑗)2𝑃𝑃𝑗𝑗=1𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖(𝑃𝑃)2                                                                            𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒. (11) 
indicating the portion of its forecast error variance which is explained by its own 
innovations. Consequently, its complement to one [1 −𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖(𝑖𝑖)]is the rate of 
involvement indicator, which measures the degree of vulnerability of country i, 
since it is the percentage of the variance of country i explained by innovations in 
other countries, being considered as a measure of country exposure to external 
shocks. In more detail, the rate of involvement – measures the degree of 
vulnerability of each country, as a degree of exposure to the external shocks – 
indicating how much “domestic” risk is explained by innovation in foreign 
countries. 
All three indicators results point towards the evidence of contagion across 
BRICS stock markets over the last two ﬁnancial crises (the LBBC and ESDC). 
5. Results 
5.1. Contagion Windows Deﬁnition 
In the ﬁrst-step result, we started by analyzing the connections among the 
BRICS markets through time. At each point of time (𝑡𝑡 = each month),38 we 
estimated the linkages across markets. These linkages are able to inﬂuence and 
determine the stock returns between the BRICS stock markets. A sharp increase of 
cross-market connections signals a contagion phenomenon, as we can see in 
figure 1 below.  
Using a 1000-days rolling window and the dynamic bivariate cointegration 
test, in the ﬁrst of the three-step analysis, we detected the connections between 
markets (long-run relationships) that lead to slow price adjustment processes. 
Further, applying the rolling indicator (Percentage of connections, discussed in 
methodology section), it is possible to detect the increasing or decreasing 
                                                          
37 Brazil, Russia, China and South Africa. 
38 The results contemplate in total 121 months and consequently, 121 rolling windows in total. 
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connections between markets that can conﬁrm the assumption of tranquil or 
turbulent period of crisis. To identify these periods, the results of the rolling 
indicator are combined with the quartiles39 to divide and set the precise timing of 
the contagion window by looking directly in the data in order to deﬁne when the 
contagion phenomenon started to spread between the two ﬁnancial crises (LBBC 
and ESDC). 40  Supposing the rolling indicator exceeds the III°  quartile 
( θIII  = UpperBound  = 75𝑡𝑡ℎ  percentile  = 40%), the percentage of relevant 
connections is considered signiﬁcantly high and, therefore, the period is 
considered as turbulent. On the other hand, supposing the percentage of 
connections is high (but does not exceed the θIII ) and there are no signiﬁcant 
changes in the number of connections, then we assume it as evidence of 
interdependence rather than contagion phenomenon (Gentile & Giordano, 2012, 
2013). Therefore, the so called “tranquil” period is identiﬁed as equal or under the III° quartile until the I° quartile (θI = Lower Bound = 25𝑡𝑡ℎ  percentile = 10%). 
Consequently, the “crisis” period is identiﬁed when the rolling indicator reveals a 
higher percentage of connections above the upper bound and the “tranquil” 
period is given when the rolling indicator reveals a lower percentage of 
connections equal to the θIII  (but without signiﬁcant changes in the number of 
connections, indicating high interdependence) or below, until the θI  (lower 
bound).  
To detect and discriminate between crises periods and tranquil periods, we 
observed the increasing connections between the countries given by the rolling 
indicator. For instance, the date of the sharpest fall in the BRICS markets was May 
200841 (see Appendix A). The same month shows a sharp increase of cross-market 
connections, as demonstrated in Figure 1, signaling a contagion phenomenon 
(Gentile & Giordano, 2012). These ﬁndings strongly support the idea that 
contagion involves externalities and is distinct because it reﬂects market failure 
and dangerously ampliﬁed transmission of instability (Gonzalez-Paramo, 2011). 
Moreover, the results support the view of (Constancio, 2012, p. 110), that the 
spread of instability is abnormal and ampliﬁed, going beyond the bounds of 
normality. 
                                                          
39 The use of quantiles to identify significant increases (abnormal) of asset price co-movements, is 
justified by recent econometrics techniques (Caporin et al., 2013; Gentile & Giordano, 2012, 2013; 
Koenker, 2005; Koenker et al. 1994; Mensi et al., 2014) 
40 Constâncio(2012, p. 110) and Caporin et al.(2013)maintain that a contagious event cannot occur in 
the absent of a shock, a large shock should occur. Enforcing the finds in this research in line with 
other studies (e.g. Fourie & Botha, 2015; Gentile & Giordano, 2012, 2013). 
41 May 2008 was also the month where the Dow Jones index reached the highest peak. The 
following months revealed that the crisis had become evident, spreading from the housing market 
to the global financial markets (Mollah et al., 2014). 
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Our results based on the rolling indicator, revealed two contagion windows 
(see Table 2). The first contagion window reveals the Lehman Brothers Crisis – 
from May 2008 to July 2009,42 while the “tranquil” period goes from January 2003 
to April 2008 (when the indicator is almost always bellow the III° quartile going 
down until the I° quartile). At the end of the “tranquil” period, the stock market 
started to show high signs of co-movements, which we considered as 
interdependence. 
Table 2. Contagion Windows Definition  
Stock Market Returns 
Lehman Brothers Bankruptcy Crisis European Sovereign Debt Crisis 
Duration: 15 Months Duration: 7 Months 
01-05-2008 – 31-07-2009:     
Approximately 327 days. In 86.67% of the 
cases the rolling indicator is strictly above 
the upper bound IIIº Quartile (θ𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼° → 40%). 
01-04-2011 – 31-10-2011: 
Approximately 152 days. In 71.43% of the 
cases the rolling indicator is strictly above 
the upper bound IIIº Quartile (θ𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼° → 40%). 
 
                                                          
42 The first window goes from May 2008 to July 2009. The data and the percentage indicator 
evidenced this period as a period of highly connections across the countries. The beginning of the 
contagion window shown in the graphical representation is coherent with the data from BRICS 
market (see Appendix A and Figure 1), but is also coherent with the signs given by the international 
markets. The Dow Jones index peaked in May 2008, as already mentioned earlier, giving strong 
support to the contagion window chosen. Indeed, the subprime crisis had devastating effects, 
bursting the global asset bubble and quickly jumped to the stock market. By October 2008 it had 
already erased around US $25 trillion from the value of stock markets. At the end of the first quarter 
of 2009, global market capitalization had already fallen 53% (Chittedi, 2014). 
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Figure 1. Graphical representation of the contagion window, using stock returns based on the results of the rolling 
indicator. 
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Figure 2. Graphical representation of the percentage of significant connections (rolling indicator), computed by applying 
a moving average of two months (MA2) and four months (MA4). 
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The second contagion window is related to the European Sovereign Debt 
Crisis – from April 201143 to October 2011. In this window, we considered the first 
and last month that did not pass the III° quartile because the jump from the 
previous month was very high (20% higher), showing evidence of contagion (see 
Figure 1). Therefore, the “tranquil” period is defined from August 2009 to March 
2011,44 lasting 20 months (covering approximately 434 days). In this window, the 
indicator shows high co-movements in almost the whole period, but they do not 
grow significantly. Hence, any continued high level of market correlation suggests 
strong connections that exist in all states of the world, suggesting a situation of 
interdependence (Gentile & Giordano, 2012). 
In Figure 2, we present the total amount of possible relationships obtained 
from the rolling indicator for the BRICS stock returns. It highlights the differences 
in the    pattern of crisis, making it possible to see the pattern of Subprime Crisis 
separately from the LBBC by applying a moving average of two and four months. 
The intensity of cross-market connections given by the rolling indicator 
shows a different pattern related to the stock market return, identifying two 
episodes of contagion. The first one begins around May 2008 and ends around 
July 2009, including consequently, both the Subprime and Lehman Bankruptcy 
                                                          
43 The date of the sharp jump to the contagion refers to the announcement of the third country 
(Portugal) asking for a bailout of e78 billion ($110 billion) from the EU and the IMF (Ray, 2015). 
44 The “tranquil” period defined from August 2009 to March 2011 was a period where the world 
financial markets were in a very high level of tension. The problems of the Eurozone started to 
spread across the Union. The global financial markets started to react, and the BRICS stock market 
was not an exception. In March 2010, the Greek Prime Minister (Papandreou) proposes a new 
financial package for Greece that includes additional public sector pay cuts and a 2% sales tax 
increase. On May 2010, IMF and Eurozone leaders agree to a e110 billion ($143 billion) bailout 
package for Greece. Portugal starts to show vulnerabilities; the bond yields start to rise together 
with high volatility in the value of the euro (Ray, 2015). On June 2010, the Euro closes at its lowest 
rate of exchange against the US dollar since March 2006. In July 2010, the EU releases the results of 
“stress tests” conducted on 91 European financial institutions. The results were very bad; seven 
institutions did not maintain the minimum amount of capital required by examiners. In September 
2010, it becomes known that the cost of bailing out Anglo Irish Bank could reach as much as e34.3 
billion ($46.6 billion). The results elevate Ireland’s budget deficit to 32% of GDP.  In November 2010, 
Ireland’s government officially applies for bailout funds from the EU and the IMF. Embattled Irish 
Prime Minister Brian Cowen submits a harsh austerity budget and promises to call a general election 
in 2011. Within a week an e85 billion ($113 billion) rescue package is approved by European leaders. 
In April 2010, Portugal’s Prime Minister (Socrates), requests a bailout relief from the EU and the IMF. 
The volatility in the markets exploded, and the contagion effect starts to spread. In June 2010, 
Standard & Poor’s downgrades Greece’s credit rating to CCC, turning Greece the world’s lowest-
rated sovereign debt (Ray, 2015). The data from BRICS stock market showed that the contagion 
effect had reached the highest peak in the ESDC indicated by the second contagion window (see 
Figure 1). 
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Crisis. The indicator shows that the peak is achieved in March and April 2009, 
reaching 100% of cross-market linkages as significant (see Figure 1). The second 
contagion window pointing to the ESDC, from April to October 2009, reaching a 
peak of cross-market linkages of 70%. This result indicates that the impact in the 
BRICS economies seems to be weaker and shorter, compared to the first 
contagion window.  
The first part of our research has considered until now just the long-run 
connections, implying just the slow price adjustment process given by the 
Johansen cointegration test. However, to verify the presence of a contagion 
effect, the total number of connections (long-run and short-run) is needed. 
Hence, the Granger causality test, the second step of our analysis will be applied 
in the next section. 
5.2. Revealing the Contagion Process 
In our second-step results, we analyze the results arising from the number of 
cross-market connections related with the “crisis” periods and compare them 
with the “tranquil” periods, by applying the cointegration test and the Granger 
causality test. The bivariate cointegration test allows the identification of 
connections between pairs of markets which lead to slow price adjustment 
process (long-run connections). But it is also possible to find the versus of each 
significant connection by applying the Gonzalo-Granger statistic. Furthermore, the 
Granger causality test identifies connections which have a short-term influence on 
the price discovery process (short-run connections), as demonstrated by Gentile 
and Giordano (Gentile & Giordano, 2012, 2013). 
The results from both techniques (cointegration test/Gonzalo Granger 
statistic and Granger causality test), allow the identification of significant cross-
market connections and the directions of the relation. Subsequently, by applying 
the two tests it is possible to establish which countries have a dominant role in 
the contagion process, because they are able to influence others “leading 
countries”, and which countries are more vulnerable and reactive to other 
countries’ price innovations “follower countries”, as one can see in Table 3. The 
difference lies in the time horizon of the price adjustment process induced by the 
existence of cross-market connections, which is the long-run for the connections 
identified by the bivariate Johansen cointegration test, while the short-run is the 
connections detected with the Granger causality test. Hence, to comprehend the 
relationship among markets and equilibrium restoration, the VECM according 
Gonzalo and Granger(1995) is applied to obtain the coefficients of ECT of speed of 
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adjustment parameters [𝛼𝛼1, 𝛼𝛼2]45 to restore the long-run relationship whenever a 
disequilibrium situation appears.  
Our results determined that in the first turmoil – LBBC, that Brazil, China, and 
South Africa (leading countries) are statistically not significant, which brings to 
light that these markets are weekly exogenous. However, they are the first to be 
affected by innovations (excluding Russia and India) and consequently, they are 
transmitting the shocks to the other markets (follower countries), being 
responsible for the contagion transmission process. Looking closely at the 
coefficients of ECT in Table3, in the long term, a shock in the financial markets 
(LBBC), impacts the stock market in Chin46 (BRA-CHI(5%)) positively and negatively 
in India47 (for IND(6%)-CHI and IND(7%)-SAF) and China (CHI(15%)-SAF). The 
information from the long term relationship indicates that under the LBBC, the 
stock market in China (BRA-CHI(5%)) provided some hedge against the contagion 
effect from LBBC, while India (IND(6%)-CHI and IND(7%)-SAF) and China 
(CHI(15%)-SAF) does not provide any hedge (Bianconi et al., 2013, p. 90). 
In the second turmoil – ESDC, our analysis indicates that Brazil, Russia, China 
and South Africa (leading countries) are statistically not significant, and 
consequently, they are all hit by the ESDC in the first moment (excluding India). 
Furthermore, the innovations from the ESDC affect positively India (BRA-
IND(12%)), China (BRA- CHI(16%)) and South Africa (for RUS-SAF(15%)), CHI-
SAF(20%)), which means that these countries seem to have a higher level of 
resilience, providing some hedge against the ESDC. In contrast, India (IND(9%)-
SAF) is affected negatively, and consequently, does not provide any kind of hedge. 
 
 
                                                          
45 For instance, in the case of (IND-SAF) for the LBBC, a positive shock in the pair of markets recover 
the equilibrium level of the negative values of the ECT’s; the VECM is valid since the ECT coefficient 
is significantly negative. This suggests that the long-run linkages are confirmed by the short-run 
linkages, suggesting contagion effects, since the ECT coefficient records a rise in magnitude during 
the instability period, suggesting thus a shift in the adjustment speed for the equity markets of these 
countries. This insight reflects the effects of the LBBC on the linkages between the US stock market 
and the BRICS markets (Boubaker et al., 2016). Indeed, looking at India stock market (IND-SAF), 
whenever a disequilibrium arises, then only 7% adjustment takes place in the first day, while the rest 
is reached in the coming days for India stock market (See Singh & Kaur, 2016). See Table 3. 
46 In the case of Brazil-China pair of countries, just the coefficient of ECT from China (follower 
country) is statistically significant. 
47 In the case of India-China and India-South Africa pair of countries, just the coefficient of ECT from 
India (follower country) is statistically significant. 
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Table 3.  Results from Cointegration Test/Gonzalo-Granger Statistics 
January 2003 to April 2008 - Tranquil period 
Pair of Countries  Gonzalo-Granger 
Statistic     
Speed of Adjustment [𝜶𝜶] Results      
α1 α2 Leading/Follower Countries  
BRAZIL - INDIA GGBRA -0.001675 
 
Leading country 
 GGIND 
 
0.011453*** 
 
Follower country 
May 2008 to July 2009 - Turbulent period: Subprime and Lehman Brothers Crisis 
Pair of Countries  Gonzalo-Granger 
Statistic     
Speed of Adjustment [𝜶𝜶] Results      
α1 α2 Leading/Follower Countries  
BRAZIL - CHINA GGBRA -0.004429 
 
Leading country   
GGCHI 
 
0.044729*** 
 
Follower country 
INDIA - CHINA GGIND -0.056525*** 
 
Follower country   
GGCHI 
 
-0.002313 
 
Leading country  
INDIA - S. AFRICA GGIND -0.069595*** 
 
Follower country   
GGSAF 
 
-0.002708 
 
Leading country  
CHINA - S. AFRICA GGCHI -0.146660*** 
 
Follower country   
GGSAF 
 
0.061711 
 
Leading country  
August 2009 to March 2011 - Tranquil period  
Pair of Countries  Gonzalo-Granger 
Statistic     
Speed of Adjustment [𝜶𝜶] Results      
α1 α2 Leading/Follower Countries  
BRAZIL - CHINA GGBRA -0.042440** 
 
Follower country 
 GGCHI 
 
0.018214   Leading country  
April 2011 to October 2011 - Turbulent period: European Sovereign Debt Crisis 
Pair of Countries  Gonzalo-Granger 
Statistic     
Speed of Adjustment [𝜶𝜶] Results      
α1 α2 Leading/Follower Countries  
BRAZIL - INDIA GGBRA -0.024887 
 
Leading country 
 GGIND 
 
0.117500*** 
 
Follower country 
BRAZIL - CHINA GGBRA 0.015320 
 
Leading country   
GGCHI 
 
0.157903*** 
 
Follower country 
BRAZIL - S. AFRICA GGBRA 0.258053*** 
 
Leading country 
 GGSAF 
 
0.237389*** 
 
Leading country 
RUSSIA - S. AFRICA GGRUS 0.081265 
 
Leading country   
GGSAF 
 
0.150673*** 
 
Follower country 
INDIA - S. AFRICA GGIND -0.085531* 
 
Follower country   
GGSAF 
 
0.093486   Leading country 
CHINA - S. AFRICA GGCHI 0.023620 
 
Leading country 
 GGSAF 
 
0.200972*** 
 
Follower country 
Notes: The results obtained from the VECM in the context of the Granger causality test, allow the 
obtainment of the speed of adjustment of the first country (𝛼𝛼1 ) and second country (𝛼𝛼2 ) 
respectively, in other words, the coefficients of error correction terms. [∗∗∗] indicates the level of 
significance at 1% level; [∗∗] at 5% level; [∗] at 10% level. [ ←] represents the leading country that 
makes the greatest contribution to the contagion transmission process by applying the Gonzalo-
Granger statistic. 
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Analyzing the results of long and short connections among the markets, it is 
possible to notice that Brazil, China and South Africa dominated the stock market 
during the LBBC as leading countries (May 2008 to July 2009) and the number of 
cross-markets connections increased sharply from 8 (January 2003 to April 2008) 
to 12 (May 2008 to July 2009). Thereafter, when the analysis is directed to the 
ESDC (April 2011 to October 2011), the number of cross-market connections 
increased from 7 (August 2009 to March 2011) to 10 (April 2011 to October 2011), 
wherein, China clearly lost the dominant role in the contagion transmission played 
in the Lehman Crisis. 
Regarding Brazil and South Africa, Brazil is the major leading country in the 
ESDC, playing a dominant role in the contagion transmission structure by 
influencing Russia, India, China (both short/long-run) and South Africa48 stock 
markets; it is followed by South Africa with much less intensity, playing a leading 
role in Brazil and India stock markets. 
A higher dominant role can be seen in the ESDC for Brazil stock market (now 
influencing also South Africa, see Appendix B, Table 3 and Figure 3), while for 
China, the dominant role of influencing other markets diminished clearly. 
Furthermore, South Africa, which during the LBBC had been able to influence 
Brazil, India and China stock markets, in the recent ESDC, it was only capable of 
influencing Brazil and India, losing the dominant role in transmitting contagion to 
China’s stock market. 
Regarding the LBBC, it is possible to analyze that Brazil and China were the 
greatest leading countries in the contagion transmission. In the first crisis, there is 
evidence of high connections concentrated in the leading countries (Brazil, China 
and South Africa); while in the second crisis the evidence points towards a 
dominant role in the contagion transmission mechanism coming strongly from 
Brazil, with much less intensity from the others. In 2008-09 crisis, Russia and India 
absorbed shocks without being able to influence other countries (pure follower 
country), signaling a high degree of vulnerability. In the case of China, this market 
absorbed shocks but also spread them, while in the case of Brazil, which is a major 
contributor to the contagion transmission (even in tranquil periods of times), was 
highly capable of spreading shocks to all other countries (in both crises) and was 
not influenced by any of them, excepting for South Africa in both crises. 
    
                                                          
48 The result in absolute value did not exceed 0.5 for Brazil (-11, 48). For South Africa, the value (12, 
48) exceeded in absolute value 0.5. Therefore, the price of the second asset (South Africa (SAF)), 
plays a bigger role compared to the first asset (Brazil (BRA)), see Table 3 above. 
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Figure 3. Stock return contagion test: short and long-run connections before and 
after the crises episodes.  
Notes: Dashed line represents the short-run connections, solid line is used to indicate the 
long-run connections and the thick solid line indicates that both countries contribute to 
the contagion transmission. Although one country plays a bigger role (“leading country”). 
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Our results also reveal the risk profile of India and China in the LBBC as 
sharply higher compared to the other countries based on the number of relevant 
connections. Therefore, the contagion process is mainly related to India and China 
stock markets. While in the ESDC, the risk profile of India and South Africa is the 
same but lower than the previous crisis, indicating that the process of contagion is 
mainly related with these two countries, with Brazil as a major source in spreading 
the contagion to all BRICS stock markets in both crises. One difference between 
the two crises studied that clearly emerges, is related to the amount of short-run 
connections during LBBC (10 short-run connections over 14 total connections) 
compared to the ESDC (5 short-run connections over 11 total connections). 
Moreover, it seems that the LBBC is characterized by a strong increase in the 
number of short-run links, while the ESDC is characterized by a higher level of 
long-run connections (7 long-run links49 over 11 total connections). 
The most important result from this analysis is related to the evidence of 
contagion as opposed to interdependence or spillover. The number of 
connections detected among countries (in both contagion windows), increased 
after the “crisis episodes” but did not remain at such a high level after the shock. 
Indeed, the number of connections increased intensively during “crisis periods” 
and then decreased drastically during “tranquil periods”. This movement is a 
critical test to distinguish between contagion and interdependence. As stated 
earlier in this research, contagion is a significant increase in the co-movement 
between assets during a period of crisis, compared with a tranquil period. 
Therefore, if there is a high level of market co-movement in all periods, that is the 
case of interdependence. As it is possible to see in this research (see Figure 1 and 
Figure 2), a higher number of connections in the BRICS stock markets which do 
not hold steady after a shock, returning to the low values once the crisis is gone, is 
a signal of a temporary distortion of the transmission channels due to shocks – 
that is contagion, instead of a systematic change in the common economic 
structure, based on the real or financial links.50  
5.3. Measuring Countries Degree of Exposure to the Contagion Process 
The last step is reached by applying the variance decomposition 
methodology, following Gentile and Giordano (2012, 2013). This methodology 
allows one to measure of each country’s degree of exposure to the inﬂuence of 
foreign markets, indicating the rate of involvement in the contagion process. 
                                                          
49 The influence of Brazil over South Africa, even though weaker, was considered (see Table3). 
50  These theories are usually based on standard transmission mechanisms, such as trade,      
monetary policy, and common shocks, for example, oil prices (See Gentile & Giordano, 2012, 2013; 
Kishor & Singh, 2014; Nikkinen et al., 2013). 
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Furthermore, the results in Table 4 below reveal that South Africa is incredibly 
more signiﬁcantly involved inthe ESDC compared with its involvement in the LBBC. 
Indeed, all the BRICS countries exhibited a signiﬁcant increase in the involvement 
of the contagion process in the second crisis ESDC. Regarding South Africa, for a 
time frame of 5 days (short term), the ratio of the forecast error variance (the rate 
of involvement indicator)51 explained by foreign markets increased from 2.82% 
(LBBC) to 31.32% (ESDC), making South Africa the most involved country in the 
contagion process with the highest degree of exposure to external shocks 
followed by India (from 11.27% to 27.30%), Russia (from 9.21% to 24%), China 
(from 21% to 31.36%) and Brazil (from 4.87% to 14.26%), with the lower degree of 
exposure to the contagion process. 
Directing the analysis to the two crises considered, the variance 
decomposition methodology provides an insight about the contagion intensity for 
the countries in the sample. For instance, during the LBBC, the most involved 
country in the contagion process was China, the degree of exposure rose (from 
12.92% to 21%) after the crisis, much higher than the other countries. Still in the 
LBBC window, it is interesting to notice that South Africa represented the lowest 
level of vulnerability (from 9.23% to 2.82%), followed by India (from 11.82% to 
11.27%), indicating that these two countries seem to have a strong degree of 
exogeneity to the system, not being aﬀected essentially by the LBBC compared to 
the other countries.52 
Concerning the ESDC, in the short-term, the most exposed country to 
external shocks and consequently more vulnerable and involved in the contagion 
process is South Africa (from 6.52% to 31.32%), followed by Russia (from 9.31% to 
24%), India (from 4.52% to 27.30%), Brazil (from 2.08% to 14.26%) and lastly, 
China (from 24.24% to 31.36%). 
Focusing the analysis on the ESDC, our results highlight that South Africa, 
Russia, India and Brazil are countries more exposed to ﬁnancial contagion, mostly 
because of their higher degree of fragility (31.32%, 24%, 27.30% and 14.26%) in 
the short period, while for the long period the degree of fragility was (59.69%, 
51%, 38.45% and 55.82%) for South Africa, Russia, Brazil and India, respectively. 
Furthermore, China records the worst performance in terms of rise of rate of 
involvement, mostly because of its high pre-Lehman vulnerability (from 24.24% to 
                                                          
51 The degree of vulnerability of each country. 
52 Looking at the long period, for South Africa (from 14.28% to 4.15%), Russia (from 12.17% to 
9.44%) and Brazil (from 6.26% to 5.14%) was essentially unaﬀected in the LBBC, whereas for India 
(from 14.75% to 17.86%) there was an increase in the vulnerability to external shocks. As regards 
South Africa, the results indicate that it is even more unaﬀected compared to the short period. 
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31.36% for the short period; and from 32.60% to 50.38% for the long period). 
Comparing both crises in terms of growth rate of vulnerability, the results indicate 
that South Africa is the most exposed to the ﬁnancial contagion (28.50% for the 
short period; and 55.54% for the long period), followed by India (16.03%) and 
Russia (14.79%) in the short period. In the long period, Russia (41.56%) overtakes 
India (37.96%), becoming more exposed to the ﬁnancial contagion than India, 
followed by Brazil with a growth rate of vulnerability of (33.31%), indicating a 
large increase in the degree of exposition to external markets in contrast with the 
short period. 
Table 4. Rate of Exposure to the Contagion Process based on the Stock Returns. 
Countries 
Forecast 
Horizon 
(Days) 
Tranquil 
period           
Pre-Lehman 
Bankruptcy 
Turbulent 
period      
Lehman     
Bankruptcy 
Df1 
 
Tranquil 
period 
Pre-Sovereign   
Debt Crisis 
Turbulent 
period 
EU Sovereign 
Debt Crisis 
Df2 
  
Brazil 
5 2.16 4.87 2.71 ↑ 2.08 14.26 12.18 ↑ 
10 6.26 5.14 -1.12 ↓ 2.26 38.45 36.19 ↑ 
    
  
  
  
Russia 5 7.72 9.21 1.49 ↑ 9.31 24.00 14.69 ↑ 
10 12.17 9.44 -2.73 ↓ 13.91 51.00 37.09 ↑ 
    
  
  
  
India  5 
11.82 11.27 -0.55↓ 14.52 27.30 12.78 ↑ 
10 14.75 17.86 3.11 ↑ 19.91 55.82 35.91 ↑ 
 
   
  
  
  
China 5 12.92 21.00 8.08 ↑ 24.24 31.36 7.12 ↑ 
10 13.42 28.19 14.77 ↑ 32.60 50.38 17.78 ↑ 
    
  
  
  
S. Africa 
5 9.23 2.82 -6.41 ↓ 6.52 31.32 24.80 ↑ 
10 14.28 4.15 -10.13 ↓ 6.40 59.69 53.29 ↑ 
Notes: The results are presented in percentage and the variance decomposition was computed 
based on 5 days (short period) and 10 days (long period) forecast horizon. Table 4 indicates the rate 
of involvement indicator [1 −𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖(𝑖𝑖)], measuring the degree of vulnerability of country 𝑖𝑖(each 
country’s stock market) explained by innovations in all other countries, working as a measure of 
country’s exposure to the external shocks (see Web Appendix B.3). [Df1] represents the difference 
between tranquil and turbulent period in the Lehman Crisis. [Df2] represents the difference between 
tranquil and turbulent period in the Sovereign Debt Crisis. For the results of each country’s 
contribution to the contagion process individually. 
6. Conclusion   
Our research contributes to a better understanding of the contagion 
phenomenon by analyzing the changes in cross-market connections for the BRICS 
stock markets. The application of VECM cointegration/Granger causality 
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methodology detected contagion measuring shifts in the shocks transmission 
channels caused by the creation of new long-run equilibrium together with the 
raising of new short-run connections, by analyzing changes in the long/short-run 
connections in both contagion windows (LBBC and ESDC). 
Our findings reveal that there was evidence of contagion in both crises, given 
that the number of cross-market connections increased sharply after such crises 
events occurred and reduced afterwards. Moreover, new long-run relationship 
between BRICS markets was created, causing a deterioration of the diversification 
benefits in both crises compared to the tranquil times (see Summary of the 
Results, Appendix C). 
In the last decades, the BRICS countries underwent an important process of 
trade and financial liberalization to benefit from the advantages of market 
integration. Therefore, integrated financial markets allow, investors to allocate 
consumption risk more efficiently, decreasing the costs of capital faced by firms 
and stimulating investment and economic growth. However, an increased 
financial integration has intensified contagion effects across markets, causing 
severe welfare losses for large geographical regions and facilitating the 
transmission of international shocks to domestic stock markets. The 
consequences have important implications for the decisions of investors’, 
regulatory and monetary authorities and for the effective portfolio diversification 
(Zouhair et al., 2014). Indicating that the effects of contagion in the BRICS markets 
can change investors’ behavior, leading to high correlations and financial 
instability in the markets, which can cause phenomena like “fight-to-quality”, 
“heard behavior” and "bandwagon" effects53 may arise (Gentile & Giordano, 
2012; Kazi & Wagan, 2014). 
Evidence from the impact caused by both crises in the BRICS stock markets 
also provides meaningful insights pertinent to international asset pricing, risk 
management and the dynamic interactions in the global economy. For instance, 
gold’s ability to act as a safe haven in the case of South Africa may have financial 
implications regarding the presence of diversification opportunities during 
extreme market conditions. With the “financialization” of the commodity 
markets, gold and oil can provide further protection against losses when the 
traditional assets (equities and bonds) experience large declines. Hence, including 
BRICS commodities in traditional portfolios, allow investors to avoid the downside 
risk in their investments. Gold can also provide protection against dollar 
                                                          
53 A way of thinking in group, in which investor’s probability of adopting any belief increases with the 
proportion who have already done so. Hence, investors do not discriminate among economic 
fundamentals across countries. 
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devaluations (Mensi et al., 2014). This research is also particularly helpful for 
portfolio risk managers, energy traders, policymakers and international investors 
who should be cautious about making investments in simultaneous markets that 
exhibit pure contagion. Knowledge of the dependencies between BRICS markets is 
crucial for policymakers to help them discern the directions of the co-movements 
and to safe guard the BRICS stock markets from contagion during future crises or 
major events. 
Understanding the reasons of financial contagion between BRICS and 
international stock markets can help policymakers to develop a prevailing 
financial system to make BRICS markets more immune to international shock 
transmission,  limiting their exposure to the contagion effects by improving stock 
market liquidity, as the BRICS markets increasingly become more integrated with 
the international markets. 
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APPENDICES 
Appendix - A: Movement of BRICS and USA stock market 
 
Figure A1. Movement of BRICS and USA stock market 
Notes: Indices for full sample in daily log-level from January 1, 2003 to October 31, 2016 
(13 years and 10 months, 3609 observations). The Highlighted first shadow refers to the 
period of the GFC 2007-2008 and the second shadow period refers to the European 
Sovereign Debt Crisis started in 2011 that will be studied in this research as a contagion 
window. The source is the author’s own, generated using EVIEWS 9.0 program. 
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Appendix - B: BRICS significant long/short-run connections 
 
Notes: The table represents the long-run (L = long-term relation extract from the bivariate cointegration test). The values 
represented for the long-term are from Johansen cointegration statistic. Regarding the short-run (S = short-term relation 
detected applying the Granger causality test). The values presented is based on the Chi-square value statistic [𝜒𝜒2]. [***] indicates 
rejection of the null hypothesis of no long-run or short-run relationship at 1% level; [**] at 5% level; [*] at 10% level. [#] 
represents the influence from one country to other countries. The number in bold identifies that both countries contribute to the 
contagion transmission process. Therefore, by applying Gonzalo-Granger statistic � 𝛼𝛼2(𝛼𝛼2−𝛼𝛼1)′ �, it is possible to establish which 
country makes the greatest contribution to the contagion transmission process. For instance, South Africa (in bold) contributes 
more to the contagion transmission than Brazil. Hence, South Africa plays a leading role in the contagion transmission. [−] 
indicates no significant connections among couple of countries from BRICS stock markets. 
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Appendix - C: Summary of the Results 
The main results obtained in our research and summarized in Table C1, 
corroborate with the discovery of more short-run than long-run connections. 
Indeed, short connections are higher due to the nature of equity prices – shorter-
term and more responsive, responding faster to shocks (Fourie and Botha, 2015). 
Therefore, in the short-run the domestic and global destabilizing factors cause 
varying levels of vulnerability in the BRICS stock market and price movements. 
These disturbances are temporary in nature since the variables revert to their 
equilibrating process to maintain the long-run co-movements. One adverse effect 
of such disparity is that it could possibly create arbitrage opportunities and short 
term speculative gains (Visalakshmi and Lakshmi, 2016). Another interesting 
feature regards Brazil. This country plays a major role in both crises as a leading 
country, serving as a channel of transmission and spreading the contagion effect 
to all other countries. Even in tranquil periods, its links are strong among the 
other BRICS countries. Another surprising finding pertains to South Africa, the 
smaller country among BRICS, but the only one connected with and capable of 
influencing Brazil in both contagion windows.54 
Table C1. Summary Results from Three-step Methodology in both Crises. 
Sbprime|Lehman  Brothers Bankruptcy Crisis European Sovereign Debt Crisis 
2008-05-01 - 2009-07-31: 15 Months 2011-04-01 - 2011-10-31: 7 Months 
Contagion Evidence: The number of cross-market 
connections has largely increased between the tranquil and the 
turbulent pe- riod: there is evidence of a contagion process. 
Contagion Evidence: The number of cross-market 
connections has largely increased between the tranquil and the 
turbulent pe- riod: there is evidence of a contagion process. 
Direction of Contagion: Brazil, China and South Africa 
dominated the stock market, playing a leading role in the 
transmission mechanism. South Africa was able to lead two major 
countries, India and China. Nevertheless, China was connected and 
influenced by all other countries to- gether with India, whereas 
Brazil was just connected with South Africa. India and Russia are 
considered pure follower countries. 
Direction of Contagion: Brazil plays a major role in the 
contagion transmis- sion, being able to influence all other 
countries fol- lowed by far by South Africa, playing a leading role 
in the transmission mechanism. China has lost its leading role in 
the shock transmission mechanism. India (as a pure follower 
country) and South Africa were the most influenced by other 
countries. 
Contagion Process: Exposure to External Shocks: 
China was the most exposed country in the Lehman Crisis both in 
the short period and in the long pe- riod. In the case of South 
Africa, the results revealed that this country is strongly not 
exposed, neither in the short period nor in the long period, 
revealing a high degree of exogeneity to the system. India also 
presents a weak degree of exposure in the short pe- riod, but was 
affected in the long period. Brazil and Russia in contrast, show an 
increase in the degree of exposure in the short period but in the 
long period, they present a lower rate of vulnerability. 
Contagion Process: Exposure to External Shocks: All 
countries are highly involved, becoming more ex- posed to the 
financial contagion. South Africa is the most exposed country in 
this crisis with the highest degree of fragility. Brazil, Russia and 
India, show al- most the same rise in the rate of involvement both 
in the short and long period, indicating a high degree of 
exposure to external markets and consequently, increasing 
domestic risk explained by innovations in foreign countries. 
Nevertheless, China seems to have the lower rate of vulnerability, 
comparing to the other BRICS countries. 
                                                          
54 South Africa has the most developed and opened financial market among BRICS countries with rapid financial 
market development and sophistication, being globally well recognized as a source possessing sophisticated 
professional services and financial expertise (see Liu et al. 2013; Zhang et al. 2013). This financial influence is 
capable of transmitting financial shocks in great degree and magnitude to the other BRICS countries (Bonga-
Bonga 2015). 
